The end of the road for human rights in private landowners' disputes? by Pascoe, Susan
1 
 





This article examines whether, and if so, to what extent, human rights are progressively 
transforming the juridical basis of the law in relation to private landowners. Human rights’ 
synergies create new dimensions of land entitlements, which alter the parameters of 
proprietary rights by augmenting the protection of occupiers of land. There accordingly need 
to be clear mechanisms to adjudicate the impact and role of human rights in private land law 
disputes, especially because the majority of tenancies are in the private sector.1 A 
comprehensive framework for doing so was not provided by the Supreme Court in McDonald 
v McDonald2 as was demonstrated by the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Watts v Stewart.3 Two areas of this complex situation are examined: firstly, the vagaries 
which undermine a coherent framework for horizontality that might erode stability and 
predictability in private land law disputes; and secondly, whether vulnerability as a heuristic 
device can result in increased human rights protection for occupiers of privately owned land. 
Constant tension and paradox between predictability and certainty on the one hand, and 
prioritising fundamental values on the other hand, encourages litigation, poses dilemmas as to 
the extent of the marginalisation of human rights and exposes social and economic injustices 
within land law which need to be addressed. 
 
Coherent framework for horizontality in private land law disputes? 
 
There has been some debate concerning horizontal effect of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (as implemented by the Human Rights Act 1998) in land law disputes,4 
because that effect determines whether the Convention imposes obligations on individuals. 
Prior to McDonald v McDonald,5 the Supreme Court had specifically not decided the issue of 
whether a defendant could raise a proportionality defence in a possession claim brought by a 
private landowner.6 The Supreme Court in McDonald7 held that a court did not have to 
consider proportionality under Article 8(2) when considering whether to make a possession 
order against a residential tenant of a private landlord and that there was no obligation to 
assess proportionality under section 21(4) of the Housing Act 1988, which gives landlords a 
mandatory right to recover possession of the property. Academic critiques of the decision in 
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McDonald have focused on lack of engagement with theories of statutory, direct, indirect, 
intermediate and remedial horizontality.8  
 
It is notable that the word “horizontal” was not used even once in the judgment in McDonald. 
The judiciary avoids engaging with theories of horizontality, preferring in specie judgments, 
rather than enunciating principles of general application. The reason for such apparent lack of 
engagement may be that theories of, or approaches to, horizontality have not been argued in 
full before the courts. Whilst judges appear to have ruled out no or full horizontal effect 
(without using the term “horizontal effect”), they have not collectively felt willing to endorse 
any particular model.9 Wright disagrees with such an assessment, however, and argues10  that 
close examination of Strasbourg case law reveals that Strasbourg treads warily in the field of 
the positive obligation to control private parties in their relationships inter se; that is why 
English courts have not found it necessary to express concluded views on the scope of section 
6 of the Human Rights Act.  
 
In this section, it is argued firstly, that McDonald is applying a species of negative obligation 
model of horizontality with the consequence that horizontality will only apply in non-
regulatory and non-consensual circumstances. Secondly, it is suggested that there is cognitive 
dissonance between the analysis in McDonald and normative adjudicative reasoning on the 
following grounds:  
▪ the contrast with the way in which the Equality Act qualifies an absolute right to 
possession;  
▪ the articulation of a confused balance between Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1;  
▪ a misconstrued rationalisation of the rule of law trumping human rights;  
▪ a problematic differentiation with horizontal effect in tortious or quasi-tortious 
relationships;   
▪ a questionable, potential change in the approach to human rights due to subsequent 
Government policy.  
Finally, in this section, it is argued that judges may be evolving a form of contextual 
horizontality to deal with the complexities involved in difficult circumstances. 
 
(a) Negative obligation model: non-regulatory and non-consensual horizontality only? 
Lord Neuberger, delivering the judgment in McDonald jointly with Baroness Hale, appears to 
be applying a species of negative obligation model11 in circumstances where there are 
contractual rights protected by legislation which have the effect of negating the applicability 
of Article 8. Some provisions of land law legislation, as demonstrated in McDonald in 
relation to section 21 of the Housing Act 1998, may appear on such an analysis to be 
incompatible with Convention rights. Section 21 is a prime example of legislation, which is 
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uncompromising in disregarding the interests of the tenant, whatever the circumstances, and 
offers no protection for tenants even in exceptional circumstances. Under this provision, a 
landlord is entitled to possession at the expiration of an assured shorthold tenancy and has 
served the requisite two months’ notice in writing on the tenant.12 Much of the general 
academic commentary on horizontal effect focuses on how far the common law should be 
developed to protect Convention rights13 rather than the type of situation which arose in 
McDonald, which derived from a legislative provision. The triggers or mechanisms for 
horizontality where statutory provisions are in issue differ distinctly from those relevant for 
development of the common law. Lord Neuberger applied the principle that where there are 
statutory provisions governing a contractual relationship, they preclude any assessment as to 
whether an order for possession would be proportionate. He recognised that Article 8 was 
engaged, but that the proportionality test could not be applied,14 which is doctrinally 
problematic.  
 
In setting out exclusionary rules for Article 8 with the justification being the provisions of the 
Protection from Eviction Act 1977, section 89 of the Housing Act 1980 and Chapters I and 
IV of the Housing Act 1988, Lord Neuberger acknowledged that those Acts all pre-date the 
Human Rights Act 1998.15 His justification, however, that they have been considered and 
approved in government reports since 2000 and confirmed by Parliament when approving 
and amending those statutes since 2000, is questionable, because Parliament has not 
addressed the issue specifically of whether those legislative provisions achieve that balance.  
 
There was no analysis by the Supreme Court of how section 21 of the Housing Act would 
apply if the landlord had been a housing association granting an assured shorthold tenancy as 
a starter tenancy. The approach in Manchester City Council v Pinnock16 and Hounslow 
London Borough Council v Powell,17 applying the proportionality assessment in Article 8(2) 
where it crosses the high threshold of being seriously arguable, would be relevant to housing 
associations exercising public functions. It seems somewhat incongruous to use the ground of 
contract and statute as justification for the McDonald decision in relation to private sector 
parties when housing associations would be relying on the same contract and statute. More 
cogent reasoning is required, which would provide justification why the same contract and 
statute do not prevent Article 8 being raised as a defence where a public authority landlord is 
concerned. The extent of the problem is further complicated by the fact that the border 
between private and public bodies has become blurred, and the test to determine a quasi-
public authority is complex as demonstrated by R (on the application of Weaver) v. London 
and Quadrant Housing Trust.18    
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Support from the European Court of Human Rights for the approach taken by the Supreme 
Court in McDonald can be found in the subsequent case of Vrzic v Croatia,19 albeit that the 
case did not involve a possession claim by a landlord, but concerned mortgage possession 
proceedings brought by a private lender. Some aspects of the negative obligation model were 
nevertheless implicitly demonstrated in the judgment in Vrzic despite the differences between 
the cases. The European Court of Human Rights noted the decision in McDonald at the 
beginning of the judgment.20 The court distinguished earlier cases such as McCann v United 
Kingdom21 and also Orlic v Croatia22 in which it was held that any person at risk of eviction 
from his home should be able to have the proportionality of that measure determined by an 
independent tribunal, because these cases concerned State-owned or socially-owned flats, so 
there was no other private interest at stake. Central to the case was that the applicants had 
voluntarily used the property as collateral and had agreed that the lender could sell the 
property in the event of default. They had failed to take the opportunity to challenge the sale 
price, or object to the valuation report, or participate in the valuation process. The subsequent 
sale, therefore, was a consequence of the applicants’ failure to meet their contractual 
obligations, and there had been no breach of Article 8 or Article 1 Protocol 1 when the sale 
was below market value.  With its emphasis on the importance of contractual rights between 
private parties and the limited role of the court in enforcing those rights, the decision echoes 
that of the Supreme Court in McDonald.23  
 
There were nevertheless relevant differences. Central to the decision in Vrzic was that the 
applicant had been at fault and that adequate procedural safeguards had existed if the 
applicants had taken advantage of them. The legal scenario in that case can be distinguished 
from section 21 of the Housing Act 1988, which does not contain any inherent safeguards to 
a tenant in the position of Ms McDonald. The European Court of Human Rights did, 
however, comment that “even in cases involving private litigation, the State is under an 
obligation to afford the parties to the dispute judicial procedures which offer the necessary 
procedural guarantees and therefore enable the domestic courts and tribunals to adjudicate 
effectively and fairly in the light of the applicable law”,24 a view which demonstrates that the 
decision in Vrzic is of extremely limited support for McDonald. That is because judicial 
procedures offering the necessary procedural guarantees were lacking in McDonald, and the 
decision in Vrzic can accordingly be distinguished on that ground.  
 
There are other pointers in the case law, however. Ivanova v Bulgaria25 was published after 
McDonald and concerned interference with Article 8 by the state in the context of a 
demolition order. It demonstrated in a broadly worded judgment that a proportionality 
defence could be available equally to cases involving private parties: “An analogy may also 
be drawn with cases concerning evictions from properties previously owned by the applicants 
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25 Ivanova v Bulgaria [2016] H.L.R. 21. 
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but lost by them as a result of civil proceedings brought by a private person, civil proceedings 
brought by a public body, or tax enforcement proceedings”.26  
 
The distinction in McDonald between the contractual/statutory paradigm where 
proportionality will not be considered, and contractual/non-statutory and statutory/non-
contractual paradigms where proportionality will be relevant renders the proportionality test 
in consensual, regulatory frameworks virtually redundant. It marginalises the test almost to 
the point of extinction due to the ubiquity of assured shorthold tenancies in the private rental 
sector, which gives tenants limited contractual freedom of choice when entering tenancy 
agreements.27 
 
(b) Cognitive dissonance between analysis in McDonald and normative adjudicative 
reasoning 
 
There is, however, disparity between the analysis in McDonald and normative adjudicative 
reasoning which renders the negative obligation model doctrinally problematic in numerous 
ways.  
 
(i) Equality Act 2010 qualifying an absolute right to possession 
Section 21 must be exercised in a way which is compatible with the Equality Act 2010, 
which was acknowledged by Lord Neuberger.28 This must also signify that section 21 must 
be exercised in a manner compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998, but Lord Neuberger 
did not analyse equivalence between the two statutory regimes and merely dismissed the 
constraints on a private landlord’s rights by the Equality Act 2010 as being laid down by 
statute without further analysis. There is no doubt that a court could interfere if a landlord’s 
sole motivation for serving the section 21 notice is discriminatory according to the Equality 
Act 2010. Human rights are, therefore, incorporated into disputes between private landowners 
through the Equality Act 2010, and the decision in McDonald creates a binary divide between 
human rights and disability in private landlord and tenant cases.  
 
It is notable that Ms McDonald suffered from mental health problems and lacked capacity to 
conduct legal proceedings, but the Equality Act 2010 was not pleaded, presumably because 
the reason for service of the section 21 notice was that Ms McDonald’s parents could no 
longer afford the necessary payments. However, if a broader view is taken of the 
circumstances which resulted in the McDonalds buying the property for their daughter due to 
her disability, then further to the Supreme Court decision in Aster Communities Ltd v 
Akerman-Livingstone,29 an automatic right to possession under section 21 of the Housing Act 
1988 might have been treated differently, and there may have been scrutiny of the effect of 
proportionality on the right to possession. Since “a court” is specifically included within the 
expression “public authority” by section 6(3)(a) of Human Rights Act 1998 Act, it is difficult 
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brought by a municipal body); and Rousk v. Sweden, no. 27183/04, 25 July 2013 (tax enforcement 
proceedings)”. 
27 See further S. Nield, ‘Shutting the Door on Horizontal Effect: McDonald v McDonald’ [2017] Conv. 60, 66. 
28 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [67]. 
29 Aster Communities Ltd v Akerman-Livingstone [2015] UKSC 15; [2015] 2 WLR 721. 
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to rationalise why human rights are treated differently, and why human rights appear to be 
less important than equality rights.30 
 
(ii) Confused balance between Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1? 
The reason Lord Neuberger gave that Pinnock and Powell would not apply is that “a private 
sector landlord can claim that any delay in giving him possession of the property to which he 
is entitled would be an interference with his rights under article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention”.31 It is notable that the first reason given by Lord Neuberger is not that the 
Convention rights are not applicable between private parties, but that the balancing act 
between Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1 would cancel the likelihood of success of a 
tenant’s defence.32 However, although it is generally assumed that Article 1 Protocol 1 
applies to the landlord so as not to interfere with “the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”, 
a tenant can arguably claim to be in need of protection of both Article 8 and Article 1 
Protocol 1. This is not acknowledged at all by Lord Neuberger whose balancing act between 
Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1 is arguably too simplistic and whose analysis of the issue is 
far too brief.  
 
In fact, in a notable case, Sims v Dacorum Borough Council,33 where the claimant joint tenant 
unsuccessfully claimed breach of Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1, it was Lord Neuberger 
who delivered the judgment, so it is a pity that Lord Neuberger did not delve into this balance 
in greater depth in McDonald. Goymour has argued that the ending of a lease in accordance 
with its terms fails to engage the tenant’s Article 1 Protocol 1 rights, because the lessee’s 
rights are circumscribed by the leasehold terms from the outset.34  Only if there is a shift in 
proprietary entitlement, Article 1 Protocol 1 will be engaged, but not if there is merely the 
enforcement of pre-existing rights. Lees, however, has argued that since the landlord’s rights 
were always subject to the human rights of the tenant, and all Article 1 Protocol 1 protects is 
pre-existing legal rights, there is no breach of the landlord’s Article 1 Protocol 1 rights by 
giving effect to a tenant’s Article 8 rights.35 This view is doctrinally consistent with the 
Human Rights Act, and in the context of the McDonald scenario, it is problematic to ignore 
the tenant’s potential Article 1 Protocol 1 rights.  
 
Developing this further, it is arguable that a tenant should pursue a breach of Article 1 
Protocol 1 against a private landlord by analogy with Pye v UK.36 It is significant that in the 
context of adverse possession, Pye was an admissible claim involving two private parties 
based on breach of Article 1 Protocol 1. Since Pye demonstrates that ending a freehold estate 
through adverse possession can be challenged under Article 1 Protocol 1, ending a leasehold 
                                                             
30 See further S. Pascoe, “Disability Discrimination: Recasting the Parameters of Proprietary Rights?” in R. 
Hickey and H. Conway (eds), Modern Studies in Property Law Vol.9, Ch.8 (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017). 
31 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [39]. See also D.S.K. Maxwell, “Disputed Property Rights: 
Article 1 Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 
2016” [2016] E.L.R. 900.   
32 It is notable that in the Supreme Court case of Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22 at [38], Lord Hope stated 
that, “as a minority group landlords, however unpopular, are as much entitled to the protection of convention 
rights as anyone”. 
33 Sims v Dacorum Borough Council [2014] UKSC 63; [2015] A.C. 1336. 
34 Sims v Dacorum Borough Council [2014] UKSC 63 at 279 citing Laws LJ in Sheffield City Council v Smart 
[2002] EWCA Civ 4; [2002] H.L.R. 34 at [46].  
35 E. Lees, “Article 8, Proportionality and Horizontal Effect” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 31, 35.   
36 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 1083. 
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estate, which is the other estate in section 1 of the Law of Property Act 1925, could also be 
challenged under Article 1 Protocol 1. There would then be scope for considering the human 
rights compliance of the system in an analogous way to Pye. In order to do so, that would 
require treating leases as property and not as contract,37 namely as proprietary rather than 
merely contractual rights in land.  
 
(iii) Should the rule of law trump human rights? 
Lord Neuberger was concerned that to allow Article 8 as a defence would undermine the rule 
of law.38 He did not want to force the state to accept a super-added requirement of addressing 
the issue of proportionality in each case where possession was sought. He set out “ensuring 
consistency of application and certainty of outcome” as “two essential ingredients of the rule 
of law”.39 However, the fact that Article 8 is engaged means that a proportionality assessment 
must be carried out and assessing proportionality would not necessarily undermine the rule of 
law. The rule of law does not mandate consistency and certainty to trump human rights. The 
Human Rights Act, which made courts the adjudicators of human rights compatibility, was 
passed in accordance with the rule of law, but Lord Neuberger is proposing to ignore a 
central element of the rule of law by bypassing the proportionality assessment required by the 
Human Rights Act.  
 
Lord Neuberger in McDonald is erroneously applying the rationale from Qazi v Harrow 
LBC,40 which he overruled himself in Pinnock and Powell and is demonstrating in McDonald 
the same resilience shown by the majority of judges in Qazi, which he subsequently 
overruled. There is a possibility that if the facts in McDonald had been different, and if the 
parents had been the de facto claimants seeking to evict their own daughter from the 
premises, then the courts may have adopted a more flexible or more nuanced approach. The 
decision in McDonald is resonant of cases where the courts do not want creditors to be kept 
waiting for their money.41 Receivers brought possession proceedings in the parents’ names in 
McDonald, because the lenders were entitled to their money and required that the property be 
sold with vacant possession, but the court avoids treating this as a mortgage repossession 
case.  
 
Although section 89(1) Housing Act 1980 allows suspension of an order for possession for a 
maximum of six weeks in cases of exceptional hardship,  Lord Neuberger in McDonald did 
not explore further the point made in Powell by Lord Hope that to postpone the execution of 
a possession order for a longer period than the statutory maximum “would go well beyond 
what section 3(1) of the 1998 Act permits”.42  As Lord Neuberger stated, “The cases in which 
it would be justifiable to refuse, as opposed to postpone, a possession order must be very few 
and far between … They could only be cases in which the landlord’s interest in regaining 
                                                             
37 See Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [1999] 3 W.L.R. 150; Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 
10; [2006] W.L.R. 570; Mitchell v Watkinson [2014] EWCA Civ 1472; [2015] L.&T.R. 22.  
38 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [43]. 
39 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [43]. For detailed analysis of the rule of law, see P. Gowder, The 
Rule of Law in the Real World (Cambridge, CUP, 2016); T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (London, Penguin, 
2011). 
40 Qazi v Harrow LBC [2003] UKHL 43; [2004] 1 A.C. 983. 
41 See, for example, Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v Bell [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 920; First National 
Bank v Achampong [2003] EWCA Civ 487; [2004] 1 F.C.R. 18. 
42 Hounslow London Borough Council v Powell [2011] UKSC 8 at [62].  
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possession was heavily outweighed by the gravity of interference in the occupier’s respect for 
her home”.43  One scenario would surely be where parents such as the McDonalds are 
claiming possession against a vulnerable daughter with serious medical problems.  In 
considering the issue in McDonald that if a proportionality assessment had been required 
where the occupier crossed the high threshold of showing an arguable case, and section 21(4) 
could be read so as to accommodate it, Corrie J at first instance would have taken the view 
that the tenant’s personal circumstances were sufficiently exceptional to justify dismissing 
the claim for possession on the basis that it was disproportionate. The Supreme Court, 
however, disagreed and was critical of that view.44   
 
On these aspects, McDonald has not overruled other areas of land law involving private 
parties where the courts have evolved greater levels of contextual adjudication and 
considered breaches of Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1 without analysing problems of 
horizontal application. Potential breaches have been rejected, not on the basis that they do not 
apply to private parties, but on more specific grounds, including there being no breach,45 in 
the areas of mortgage possession proceedings,46 possession actions by a trustee in 
bankruptcy,47 application for sale under section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of 
Trustees Act 1996,48 in adverse possession49 and overreaching.50  
 
Phillipson and Williams argue that the rule of law is another reason why judges are not 
engaging in theories of horizontality, because none of the models so far advanced draw on 
background constitutional fundamentals, including those of particular concern to the 
judiciary, such as the rule of law.51 Instead academic commentary has concentrated on the 
Act in isolation from its constitutional backdrop. They note that direct and full horizontalists 
argue for the effective collapsing of the distinction between public and private bodies, and 
that it is a deliberate omission by the Human Rights Act to provide specific guidance on 
horizontal effect.  They argue that stronger models of horizontal effect, which purport to 
impose absolute obligations on the court to act compatibly with Convention rights in the 
private sphere, lack precision and concrete content. Their view is that, in practice, the 
relevant horizontally applicable Convention rights are likely to operate under the Human 
Rights Act as principles or values i.e. as reasons for making a decision rather than hard-edged 
rights. However, Wright notes that the term “horizontal effect” fails to capture the fact that 
                                                             
43 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [73]. 
44 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [71]-[75]. 
45 See S. Pascoe, “Europe, Human Rights and Land Law in the Twenty-First Century: An English Example” 
(2011) 1 Prop. L. Rev. 179 at 191-193. 
46 Barclays Bank Plc v Alcorn [2002] EWHC 498; [2002] 2 P.&C.R. DG10; Horsham Properties Group Ltd v 
Clark [2008] EWHC 2327; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1255. 
47 Barca v Mears [2004] EWHC 2170; [2005] 2 F.L.R. 1; Nicolls v Lan [2006] EWHC 1255; [2007] 1 F.L.R. 
744; Ford v Alexander [2012] EWHC 266; [2012] B.P.I.R. 528.  
48 National Westminster Bank Plc v Rushmer [2010] EWHC 554; [2010] F.L.R. 362; Fred Perry (Holdings) Ltd 
v Genis [2015] 1 P.&C.R. DG5. 
49 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 1083; Ofulue v Bossert [2008] EWCA Civ 7; 
[2009] Ch. 1. 
50 City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] A.C. 54; National Westminster Bank Plc v Malhan [2004] 
EWCA Civ 847; [2004] 2 P.&C.R. DG 9. 




the obligations of state and non-state actors are of a different order.52 Her view is that 
horizontal effect of human/constitutional rights will at most be a partial translation of the 
obligation into the private sphere: an obligation to “respect”, but not to protect or fulfil the 
relevant standards.   
 
(iv) Tortious or quasi-tortious relationships in private law- horizontal effect? 
The distinction drawn by Lord Neuberger in McDonald between contractual and tortious 
relationships, in deciding whether a court is obliged to carry out a proportionality assessment 
to balance Convention rights, demonstrates that human rights retain a distinctive role in 
disputes between private landowners. Lord Neuberger recognised that Convention rights will 
be relevant between private parties in tortious or quasi-tortious relationships.53 The position 
then arguably becomes the same whether the landlord or landowner is a public sector or 
private landlord, which is precisely the situation which Lord Neuberger was seeking to avoid 
in the specific circumstances of McDonald. The Supreme Court was not saying, however, 
that a trespasser would be afforded more protection than an assured shorthold tenant, so there 
is no exact equivalence between the two, and a direct parallel cannot be drawn. Since torts are 
common law claims, indirect horizontal effect whereby the Convention influences the 
development of the common law between private parties, is relevant to analysis relating to 
the incremental development of the common law as a result of the Convention.54 
 
In some cases for possession against trespassers in the lower courts, the issue of horizontal 
effect has been assumed, and in others, it has not been discussed.55 In two notable cases, it 
was suggested horizontal effect was possible. In Malik v Fassenfelt,56 the view of Sir Alan 
Ward was that the court must consider a possession action by a private landowner in a similar 
way to one brought by a public landowner. In Manchester Ship Canal Developments Ltd v 
Persons Unknown,57 Pelling J held that Article 8 was capable of being engaged in relation to 
possession claims brought by private landowners against trespassers following the reasoning 
of Sir Alan Ward in Malik, although it would only be in exceptional circumstances that 
trespassers’ Convention rights would trump a landowner’s Article 1 Protocol 1 rights.  
 
Viewing the issue from this perspective, it might be thought that McDonald contains 
conflicting comments on the applicability of Article 8 to trespass claims. Lord Neuberger 
noted that there were a number of residential occupiers, including trespassers, bare licensees, 
sharers with the landlord, some temporary occupiers as well as mortgagors58 who, whilst not 
being protected by the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, could be peaceably physically 
                                                             
52 J. Wright, “A Damp Squib? The Impact of section 6 HRA on the Common Law: Horizontal Effect and 
Beyond” [2014] P.L. 289 at 291. 
53 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [46]. 
54 See G. Phillipson and A. Williams, “Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint” (2011) 74 M.L.R. 
878; G. Phillipson, “The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect”, and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper” 
(1999) 62 M.L.R. 824; J.F. Krahe, “The Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law Relationships” [2015] 
E.J.C.L. 124, 150. 
55 See E. Lees, “Actions for Possession in the Context of Political Protest: the Role of Article 1, Protocol 1 and 
Horizontal Effect” [2013] Conv. 211.   
56 Malik v Fassenfelt [2013] EWCA Civ 798; [2013] 3 EGLR 99 at [28] and compare Lord Toulson at [45]. 
57 Manchester Ship Canal Developments Ltd v Persons Unknown [2014] EWHC 645.      
58 As demonstrated in Ropaigealach v Barclays Bank plc [2000] Q.B. 263: see Lord Neuberger in McDonald v 
McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [42]. 
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evicted without recourse to the court and would not have the opportunity to raise human 
rights considerations during possession proceedings.59 Yet he had set out earlier in his 
judgment the view that chapter IV of the Housing Act 1988 imposes damages on a landlord 
who unlawfully ejects a residential occupier and extends the ambit of harassment. The 
justification for the differentiation of treatment of tortious and contractual relationships is 
unconvincing.60 The consequence is that the judgment in McDonald is confined to ruling out 
applicability of the proportionality test in Article 8 in relation to possession claims by private 
landlords, but not in relation to trespass or other torts.   
 
(v) Relevance of changing Government policy? 
Lord Neuberger’s analysis in McDonald61 of White Papers62 placed great importance on 
Government policy since 1977 to determine policy as interpretive tools. This raises the 
poignant question whether the reshaping or reformulation of policies enunciated in the White 
Paper: Fixing our broken housing market63 published on 7 February 2017 could have an 
impact on the decision in McDonald and its application to future cases. The White Paper 
urges doing more to prevent homelessness and states that, “Our focus now is on ensuring that 
more people get the help they need before they become homeless, to prevent a crisis from 
happening in the first place”.64 If that approach had been adopted in McDonald, the analysis 
might have been different, and the court might have shown more flexibility in 
accommodating the needs of all parties rather than accepting the inevitability that Ms 
McDonald could become homeless. The White Paper recognised that losing a private sector 
tenancy is now the main cause of homelessness.65 Yet the stated aim of the White Paper, “to 
prevent people reaching crisis point”,66 was conspicuously not the approach adopted in 
McDonald.  
 
An additional problem regarding Article 8 protection of tenants is that homeless people are 
being increasingly discharged to the private sector. The Localism Act 2011 gave more scope 
to local authorities to place homeless people in private rented accommodation.67 Tenants will 
accordingly not have the Article 8 protection which they would have if the landlord were a 
public or quasi-public authority. Some assistance will be provided by the Homelessness 
Reduction Act 2017, which states68 that a person is threatened with homelessness if a valid 
notice has been given to that person under section 21 of the Housing Act 1988, which was the 
specific statutory provision in issue in McDonald. The Act will require councils to provide 
advisory services to those threatened with homelessness, as well as those who are homeless, 
and the Act significantly broadens the remit of those who must be helped. The government is 
                                                             
59 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [42]. 
60 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [27]. See also J. Dilcock and A. Oldfield, “Evicting Article 8: 
Human Rights and Possessions” (2016) 1635 E.G. 66.  
61 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [11]-[19].  
62 White Paper, Housing: the Government’s Proposals (Cm.214) (1987) and White Paper, Our Future Homes: 
Opportunity, Choice and Responsibility (Cm.2901) (1995).  
63 White Paper, Fixing our Broken Housing Market (Cm.9353) (2017).  
64 White Paper, Fixing our Broken Housing Market para.4.50.  
65 White Paper, Fixing our Broken Housing Market para.4.49. 
66 White Paper, Fixing our Broken Housing Market para.4.53. 
67 Housing Act 1996 s.193 was amended by the Localism Act 2011 to include a power for local housing 
authorities to discharge the main homelessness duty by way of a private rented sector offer- see Housing Act 
1996 s.193(7AA).  
68 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 s.1(3), which is to become Housing Act 1996 s.175(5).  
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providing £61 million to councils to meet the costs incurred, which may be inadequate due to 
the extent of the problem. Councils will be required to start assessing someone at risk of 
being made homeless 56 days before losing their home rather the current period of 28 days.69 
These changes might potentially give grounds for the McDonald decision to be distinguished 
in future cases. 
 
(c) Contextual horizontality 
 
It is argued here that a more nuanced form of horizontality is required in order to recognise 
the intricacies and subtleties germane to making decisions on complex facts. More suited to 
such circumstances is what is termed here “contextual horizontality”. Indeed, the corollary of 
the negative obligation model may be a form of contextual horizontality with the context 
decided by the Supreme Court without justification from the Human Rights Act itself. It is 
understandable in light of such a plethora of models70 why courts choose not to engage in 
more abstract discussions of models of horizontality. Although the Supreme Court decision 
has been analysed in terms of remedial horizontality,71 it is arguable that remedial 
horizontality is nullified by Lord Neuberger’s judgment, because “To hold otherwise would 
involve the Convention effectively being directly enforceable as between private citizens so 
as to alter their contractual rights and obligations, whereas the purpose of the Convention is, 
as we have mentioned, to protect citizens from having their rights infringed by the state”.72 
Lord Neuberger in McDonald is not undertaking what Mullender terms “qualified 
deontology”.  Whilst Article 8 purports to uphold a set of rights established regardless of 
consequences, paragraph 2 of Article 8 allows for Article 8’s restriction by reference to 
consequentialist considerations (“legitimate aims”), provided there is a pressing social need 
to do so and the restriction is proportionate. The court’s capacity to make policy decisions in 
Convention cases will be more constrained than when engaging in ordinary common law 
adjudication, but McDonald exemplifies the consensual, regulatory framework in which no 
qualified deontology is possible.  
It is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal in Jones v Canal and River Trust73 placed the 
emphasis on context, although the case did concern a public waterways authority. McCombe 
LJ, with whom the other two judges agreed, distinguished Pinnock and the other public 
authority cases, as not demonstrating a true exception to the requirement of a structured 
approach to the proportionality assessment,74 and on the facts of their own case, focused on 
context by stating, “I do not consider the overall context of the proceedings allowed the judge 
to summarily dismiss the Article 8 defences as he did.”75 The view of the Court of Appeal 
was that the relative weight of the competing interests of a boat operator and his personal 
circumstances might give rise to a seriously arguable Article 8 defence.  
                                                             
69 See Housing Act 1996 s.175(4). 
70 Leigh distinguished six types of horizontal effect: ‘direct statutory horizontality’,  ‘public liability 
horizontality’, ‘intermediate horizontality’, ‘remedial horizontality’, ‘indirect horizontality’, and ‘full or direct 
horizontality’: see I. Leigh, "Horizontal rights, the Human Rights Act and privacy: lessons from the 
Commonwealth?" (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 57. 
71 S. Nield, “Shutting the Door on Horizontal Effect: McDonald v McDonald” [2017] Conv. 60, 66. 
72 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 at [41]. 
73 Jones v Canal and River Trust [2017] EWCA 135. 
74 Jones v Canal and River Trust [2017] EWCA 135 at [52]. 




In relation to private parties, contextual horizontality is evident in Watts v Stewart76 where Sir 
Terence Etherton, delivering the sole judgment of the Court of Appeal, struggled to derive 
clear guidance from Lord Neuberger’s judgment in McDonald and applied horizontal effect 
to the dispute between the private parties. He recognised the fact that where Article 8 is 
engaged, this necessitated that a proportionality assessment was relevant and should be 
applied. This acknowledgement remedies a conceptual weakness in the McDonald judgment, 
because an interference with Article 8 can only be assessed by undertaking a proportionality 
assessment.  
 
In this important respect, Watts v Stewart77 is a significant case on the application of human 
rights law to private bodies and charities. The appellant’s arguments were hindered by a 
concession made in the county court that the trustees of the charity were not a public 
authority. The appellant sought to withdraw that concession in the Court of Appeal, but the 
court held that this was a mixed question of fact and law and that it was not appropriate to 
reopen the issue. Rather, the court held that the appellant, Ms Watts, the occupier of an 
almshouse, was a beneficiary under the charitable trust; she did not have exclusive possession 
of the property and was a licensee not a tenant. Exclusion of security of tenure for occupiers 
of almshouses was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  
 
After a fairly comprehensive review of McDonald, Sir Terence Etherton stated concisely that, 
“The question as to when art.8 is engaged therefore remains unclear on the authorities. 
However, for the purposes of the present case we are prepared to proceed on the assumption 
that its facts do fall within the ambit of art.8 for the purposes of engaging art.14”.78  The 
effect of this, however, is to blunt much of the harshness of the perceived ratio of McDonald, 
and it is significant that the Court of Appeal could not ascertain clear guidance from 
McDonald. If McDonald is confined to its specific facts and the specific statutory provision 
of section 21 of the Housing Act 1988, the consequence of Watts is that Article 8 can be 
applicable in other factual and legal scenarios.  
 
Sir Terence Etherton was viewing the issue of possession through the prism of having to be 
Convention compliant and took a broad-brush approach. He did not distinguish Southward 
Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker79 on the basis that it involved a public authority. He had 
no hesitation exploring the issue of whether there was justification for differential treatment 
of almspersons and whether such treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim.80 The ratio of McDonald did not prevent an exploration of the issue of 
proportionality under Article 14 between private landowners. Quoting from Blecic v 
Croatia,81 Sir Terence Etherton assumed that Blecic applied in the same way as far as 
horizontal effect was concerned. “… the state enjoys an equally wide margin of appreciation 
as regards respect for the home in circumstances such as those prevailing in the present case, 
                                                             
76 Watts v Stewart [2016] EWCA Civ 1247.  
77 Watts v Stewart [2016] EWCA Civ 1247. 
78 Watts v Stewart [2016] EWCA Civ 1247 at [75]. 
79 Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615; [2016] Ch. 443.  
80 Watts v Stewart [2016] EWCA Civ 1247 at [84]-[87]. 
81 Blecic v Croatia (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 13. 
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in the context of article 8”.82 Applying this approach, a court will only intervene if the 
situation is manifestly disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued, but Sir Terence 
Etherton did equate proportionality analysis for private and public authority landowners.  
 
Sir Terence Etherton appears in his reasoning to be exercising what Somers terms “system 
responsibility”: the responsibility of the state to protect human rights in horizontal 
relationships.83 Somers’ view is that it was only a matter of time before human rights as 
legally enforceable instruments would be applied by a court in horizontal relationships, 
because the notion of human rights stems from social-contract theory, and human rights in 
this theory essentially have a horizontal dimension.84 He did acknowledge that Article 8 
cannot be applied directly in horizontal relations, because this must be precluded due to the 
effect on legal certainty: one cannot expect citizens to know the evolutions in the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, especially not in relation to topics where there is no 
jurisprudence of the Court at hand.85  
 
In addition, Sir Terence Etherton is adopting public law norms as an overarching system of 
values along the lines advocated by Krahe.86 Krahe’s view in relation to indirect horizontal 
effect is that it can be explained either as a result of the objective nature of public law norms 
as an overarching system of values (what he terms “indirect Model A”), which would appear 
to be the model adopted in Watts v Stewart,87 or by focusing instead on the subjective nature 
of public law norms as rights to respect, protection and fulfilment (referred to as “indirect 
Model B”).88 With increased recognition that human rights norms, which flow from the 
relationship between citizen and state and are thus public in nature, affect the private sphere, 
the borders between public and private law are becoming progressively blurred. An 
advantage of adopting a public norms framework is that such a framework avoids 
straitjacketing the courts to one of the theories of horizontality whilst enabling them to retain 
flexibility.  
 
According to Krahe, English courts are able to adhere to indirect Model A, because the 
European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence does not have binding force in English law, 
and the English judiciary’s general willingness to follow Strasbourg is increasingly being 
called into question.89 The focus that indirect Model B places on human rights as subjective 
public law rights, although uncontroversial in the German and European legal contexts, is 
alien to English law’s traditional emphasis on liberties rather than rights. In Krahe’s view, 
indirect Model B, which emphasises the courts’ obligations to respect and protect human 
rights, would accomplish several objectives: it would provide sound doctrinal footing, bring 
English law into line with the European Court of Human Rights, render the balancing process 
between competing rights more predictable, and serve to structure the interpretation and 
development of both common law and statute. Sparing use of public law norms as standards 
                                                             
82 Watts v Stewart [2016] EWCA Civ 1247 at [85]. 
83 S. Somers, “Protecting Human Rights in Horizontal Relationships by Tort Law or Elaborating Tort Law from 
a Human Rights Perspective” [2015] E.H.R.L.R. 149. 
84 S. Somers, “Protecting Human Rights in Horizontal Relationships” [2015] E.H.R.L.R. 149 at 153. 
85 S. Somers, “Protecting Human Rights in Horizontal Relationships” [2015] E.H.R.L.R. 149 at 160.  
86 J.F. Krahe, “The Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law Relationships” [2015] E.J.C.L. 124. 
87 Watts v Stewart [2016] EWCA Civ 1247. 
88 J.F. Krahe, “The Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law Relationships” [2015] E.J.C.L. 124 at 125. 
89 J.F. Krahe, “The Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law Relationships” [2015] E.J.C.L. 124 at 153. 
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for the development of subjective private law rights does, however, preserve the distinction 
between public and private law,90 which is important for English cases to preserve. 
 
Effect of vulnerability as a heuristic device? 
 
The next section examines whether vulnerability of an occupier is a factor in encouraging 
courts to give greater weight to human rights considerations. When Lord Neuberger stated in 
Pinnock that the suggestion put forward on behalf of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, that proportionality is more likely to be a relevant issue “in respect of occupants 
who are vulnerable as a result of mental illness, physical or learning disability, poor health or 
frailty”,91 he opened the door to the proportionality test in Article 8 cases being accorded 
greater weight and significance in some cases involving public authority landlords. His 
statement is notably broader than the definition of disability in the Equality Act. In such 
cases, in Lord Neuberger’s view, it will be harder for the landlord to satisfy the court of the 
proportionality issue. Lord Neuberger repeated this view in Aster Communities Ltd v 
Akerman-Livingstone,92 citing from his earlier judgment in Pinnock, but Lord Neuberger has 
not applied this to cases involving private landowners. If someone in Ms McDonald’s 
position due to her mental health issues and vulnerability to commit suicide could not 
establish that the decision was disproportionate, it is difficult to envisage circumstances 
where disproportionality could be established. However, a common underlying theme in 
cases where the Convention has been considered applicable between private landowners 
involves some element of vulnerability broadly defined and tacit recognition of helping those 
in need.  
 
In contrast to McDonald, Watts v Stewart93 does demonstrate the flexibility needed to help 
the vulnerable where necessary. The principal object of the charity (of which the claimants 
were trustees) was to provide accommodation in almshouses to “poor single women of not 
less than 50 years of age” who lived in the parish of Ashtead. The case raised issues relevant 
to the status of 35,000 almshouse residents of 1,700 almshouses, so was of considerable 
potential significance. The purposes of the charity included “relieving either generally or 
individually persons … who are in conditions of need, hardship or distress by making grants 
of money or providing or paying for items, services or facilities calculated to reduce the need, 
hardship or distress of such persons”. The charity was clearly helping vulnerable people, 
although Mrs Watts’ specific circumstances did not evoke sympathy, because she had acted 
in an anti-social and aggressive manner and in breach of the terms of the Appointment Letter.  
 
The emerging concept involved in this discussion of vulnerable groups has been examined by 
Peroni and Timmer,94 who trace it back to the Roma minority in Chapman v United 
                                                             
90 J.F. Krahe, “The Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law Relationships” [2015] E.J.C.L. 124 at 154. See 
also A.L. Young, “Horizontality and the Constitutionalisation of Private Law” in K.S. Ziegler and P.M. Huber, 
Current Problems in the Protection of Human Rights: Perspectives from Germany and the UK (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2013) Ch 5 at 70 who analyses the extent to which horizontality can lead to the constitutionalisation 
of the content of private law.  
91 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 at [64]. 
92 Aster Communities Ltd v Akerman-Livingstone [2015] UKSC 15 at [56]. 
93 Watts v Stewart [2016] EWCA Civ 1247.  
94 L. Peroni and A. Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human 
Rights Convention Law” [2013] I.J.C.L. 1056.  
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Kingdom,95 who were in need of special protection. The concept has extended to include 
people with mental disabilities96 as a particularly vulnerable group in society who have 
suffered considerable discrimination in the past, as well as to people with HIV and asylum 
seekers. Peroni and Timmer analyse vulnerability as a heuristic device97 and acknowledge 
that the relationship between vulnerability and human rights is a contested terrain. Since there 
is recognition that human rights may fail to adequately protect those who are marginalised, 
various Conventions endeavour to protect these interests specifically.98 They argue that in 
response to the exclusions under human rights law, the Strasbourg Court has been forced to 
attend to the constructed disadvantage of certain groups, and in so doing, has deployed the 
concept of group vulnerability.99 Prejudice, stigmatisation, social disadvantage and material 
deprivation are all indicators of vulnerability.  
 
Using Fredman's multi-dimensional characterisation of substantive equality,100 Peroni and 
Timmer argue that the Court's insertion of the notion of vulnerable groups has addressed 
substantive equality's four chief aims: participation, transformation, redistribution, and 
recognition.101 The case law examined by Peroni and Timmer demonstrates that the Court has 
embraced several aspects of substantive equality by establishing positive obligations towards 
vulnerable groups in both the context of Article 14 and of freestanding Convention rights in 
Articles 8 and 3, which may not associate themselves with equality-based reasoning as easily 
as Article 14. Moreover, the Court's recognition of positive obligations towards members of 
particularly vulnerable groups has often involved “special consideration to” or “special 
protection of” their “specificities” and “needs”.102 This kind of reasoning reflects an 
asymmetry that characterises substantive equality: when it comes to the most vulnerable, 
states are obliged to provide a level of protection that is more responsive or tailored to their 
particular needs and concerns.103  
 
Vulnerability was evident in Zehentner v Austria,104 which concerned private parties, where 
the complainant suffered from severe mental illness and lacked legal capacity. Judicial sale of 
her home and eviction to satisfy payment orders for debts were held to violate Article 8 and 
                                                             
95 Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) E.H.R.R. 18. Peroni and Timmer at 1065 trace its evolution through DH v 
Czech Republic (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 3; Sampanis v Greece (2008) (32526/05); Orsus v Croatia (2011) 52 
E.H.R.R. 7; VC v Slovakia (2014) 59 E.H.R.R. 29; Kiyutin v Russia (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 29; MSS v Belgium 
(2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 2. 
96 Kiss v Hungary (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 38 at [42] which concerned the disenfranchisement of people with mental 
disabilities in Hungary where the court embraced a “social model” of disability recognising society’s negative 
attitude as the main factor disabling and excluding people. 
97 L. Peroni and A. Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups” [2013] I.J.C.L. 1056 at 1059-1060 deriving the term from 
M.A. Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition” 20 Yale J.L.& 
Feminism 1, 9 (2008-2009). 
98 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. 
99 L. Peroni and A. Timmer “Vulnerable Groups” [2013] I.J.C.L. 1056 at 1062. 
100 S. Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, OUP, 2011) at 25-33.  
101 L. Peroni and A. Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups” [2013] I.J.C.L. 1056 at 1074. 
102 L. Peroni and A. Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups” [2013] I.J.C.L. 1056 at 1076 citing Chapman v United 
Kingdom (2001) E.H.R.R. 18; MSS v Belgium (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 2 and Yordanova v Bulgaria (2012) 
(25446/06).  
103 L. Peroni and A. Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups” [2013] I.J.C.L. 1056 at 1076.   
104 Zehentner v Austria (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 22. 
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Article 1 Protocol 1 due to a lack of procedural safeguards and her mental incapacity. In 
McDonald, Lord Neuberger distinguished Zehentner on the grounds that Austria did not 
challenge the contention that Article 8 was engaged and that the case did not concern a 
landlord’s right to possession.105 However, if the Zehentner approach had applied in 
McDonald, lack of procedural safeguards might have meant that more exhaustive steps would  
have been necessary to safeguard Ms McDonald’s position as a result of arrears in her 
parents’ mortgage payments allowing further postponement of the order for possession to 
ensure a smooth transition towards Ms McDonald renting another property, since her rent 
was in any event covered by housing benefit. Because the case concerned proceedings prior 
to recovery of mortgage arrears, there could have been consideration of the procedural side-
stepping of the forbearance mechanisms in section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 
1970.106 This may not, however, have assisted, because the pre-condition for exercising the 
powers of adjournment of proceedings, staying or suspending execution of the judgment or 
order or postponing the date for delivery of possession are dependent on the mortgagor being 
likely to be able within a reasonable period to pay sums due under the mortgage. In addition, 
Ms McDonald should have been given an additional two months as an unauthorised tenant 
under section 1 of the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants etc) Act 2010 to vacate 
her home, but there was no consideration of this in McDonald.107  
 
McDonald demonstrates that where the Equality Act 2010 is not specifically pleaded in 
English cases, the notion of vulnerability does not yet have a freestanding place in English 
law in relation to private parties. As a result, the redistributive aspect of substantive equality 
to which Peroni and Timmer refer, resulting in the socio-economic nature of the positive duty 
imposed on states,108 has no Supreme Court backing in relation to private landowners. By 
way of contrast, underlying the judgment in Watts is a sensitivity of approach which appears 
implicit in the analysis, even if it is not articulated in the decision itself, such that an 
asymmetrical approach could emerge in deserving cases, even though Watts itself was not 




The Human Rights Act envisages some role for Convention rights in litigation between 
private parties, even though the Act leaves the extent of this role unclear.109 The factual 
matrix of a human rights challenge to a statutory provision, which gives the landlord an 
absolute right to possession, needs be differentiated from other cases of private land law 
disputes where a flexible and contextual approach to horizontality is adopted. Such an 
                                                             
105 McDonald v McDonald at [51]. Lord Neuberger also distinguished at [52] Zrilic v Croatia (2013) (46726/11) 
on similar grounds. Brezec v Croatia [2014] H.L.R. 3 at [53] was distinguished on the grounds it had been a 
state-owned company. Belchikova v Russia (2010) (2408/06) at [54] was distinguished on the ground that there 
was no challenge to Article 8 being invoked. Mustafa v Sweden [2008] 52 E.H.R.R. 24 at [56]-[58] was 
distinguished, because it only established that Article 8 was engaged and that the Swedish government had 
failed to enact legislation to satisfy Article 10.   
106 S. Nield, “Thumbs Down to the Horizontal Effect of Article 8” [2015] Conv. 77, 84.  
107 S. Nield, “Thumbs Down to the Horizontal Effect of Article 8” [2015] Conv. 77, 84. 
108 L. Peroni and A. Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups” [2013] I.J.C.L. 1056 at 1077 analyse Yordanova v Bulgaria 
(2012) (25446/06) at [130] where the court stated, “[A]n obligation to secure shelter to particularly vulnerable 
individuals may flow from article 8 in exceptional cases”.  




approach enables judges to avoid being placed in a “straitjacket” whereby their judgments are 
inevitably confined within pre-determined guidelines or principles. At present, following the 
decision in McDonald, there is little scope for a challenge to a landlord’s absolute right to 
possession at the end of an assured shorthold tenancy under section 21 of the Housing Act 
1988. This is because there is no requirement for a private landlord to give grounds for 
possession. In the absence of such a requirement to specify grounds, it is difficult for a court 
to establish proportionality in circumstances where the Equality Act 2010 is not pleaded, 
especially as there is no judicial backing for the proposition that section 3 of the Human 
Rights Act mandates an implied term that possession cannot be ordered unless it is 
proportionate to do so. The Supreme Court would have preferred a declaration of 
incompatibility rather than imply such a term.  
 
The decision in McDonald may reflect the biases of the judges, many of whom may be 
private landlords themselves, who might take the view that public authorities can bear the 
expense and burden of dealing with Article 8 defences in exceptional cases for deserving 
tenants, but that private landlords should not be burdened by such social responsibility. The 
way forward for a future decision challenging an absolute right to possession could be to 
distinguish McDonald by championing changes in Government policy and challenging any 
side-stepping of mortgage possession proceedings in a similar factual scenario to McDonald, 
such a scenario being unusual in cases where landlords are seeking possession. There could 
also be a challenge to the maximum postponement period of six weeks, for example, if a 
tenant needs to apply for housing benefit in order not to be made homeless, or if further time 
is needed so that state mechanisms for helping those most in need would be triggered by new 
formalised procedures under the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. 
 
The courts’ apparent lack of engagement with theories of horizontality is deliberate, which 
may be to allow judicial flexibility and contextualised adjudication or alternatively, it may be 
to close down any discussion, because judges do not welcome this power. There are, 
however, moral and humanitarian grounds for incorporating human rights into disputes 
between private landowners, even though such incorporation is necessarily at the expense of 
certainty. The tenant who is about to become a property outsider is desperately trying to crack 
the glass ceiling to remain a property insider.110 Seeking to rely on Article 8 is often a last 
resort and a cry for help where society is not caring adequately for the most vulnerable. 
Bilateral initiatives are needed whereby the state safeguards the position of the private 
landlord, for example, paying financial compensation (the equivalent of housing benefit) to a 
landlord for whom there is a delay in obtaining possession, and also protects vulnerable 
tenants who need longer to resolve their housing problems in order to avoid becoming 
homeless.  
 
Flexibility to shift where necessary from a property absolutist stance to that of a property 
relativist basing ownership on qualified entitlements would enable the economic and social 
realities faced by tenants to be evaluated and would offer a welcome move away from the 
blunt instrument of a possession order. Some process of fine-tuning and moulding is needed 
to prevent the scales being weighted too heavily in favour of a landlord without the 
possibility in exceptional cases of a nuanced or balanced approach. As Rose has argued, the 
problem of substituting “mud” rules for “crystal” ones is that we substitute fuzzy, ambiguous 
rules for what seem perfectly clear demarcations of entitlement.111 However, friction in 
                                                             
110 See L. Fox O’Mahony, “Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism” (2014) C.L.P. 409.   
111 C.M. Rose, “Crystals and Mud in Property Law” 40 Stan.L.Rev. 577, 578 (1987-1988).   
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English land law in relation to private landowners’ disputes between human rights, autonomy 
and equality on the one hand, and certainty, efficiency and crystalline rules to discourage 
litigation on the other, reveals deep tensions between justice-based and certainty-based land 
law.        
 
